Increasing Confidence in the Liberian Judiciary: A Shift in the Dispensation of Justice by Bright, U-Jay W.H.S.
[155] 
U-JAY W.H.S. BRIGHT*
Increasing Confidence in the Liberian 
Judiciary: A Shift in the Dispensation of Justice 
Introduction ...................................................................................... 155 
I. A Brief Overview of the Liberian Court System ................... 158 
II. Challenges and Padlocks Hindering the Efficiency of the
Liberian Judiciary .................................................................. 160 
A. The Constitutional Walls ............................................... 160 
1. Executive Padlocks ................................................... 161 
a. The President’s Appointing Power .................... 161 
b. Subtle Interference ............................................. 164 
2. Legislative Constraints ............................................. 165 
a. The Creation of Courts ...................................... 165 
b. The Removal of Judges ..................................... 166 
B. Archaic Laws Within the Circuit Courts – The
Unpopular Jury System .................................................. 168 
C. The Bystanders: Liberian National Bar Association ...... 170 
III. Judicial Reforms .................................................................... 172 
A. Challenges Amid the Reform Process ........................... 173 
Conclusion ........................................................................................ 174 
INTRODUCTION 
he judicial branch of Liberia is experiencing tremendous 
reforms ranging from increments in salaries, allowances, 
technical training, and infrastructure development.1 However, the 
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question that haunts the public is: why is public perception about the 
judiciary still low amid these tremendous reforms?  
A recent survey shows 73 out of 100 lawyers reported dissatisfaction 
with the performance of the judiciary amid the reforms process.2 Many 
questions beg for answers from the survey. Why, despite those reforms, 
is the perception of the judiciary still low? What are the causes of 
lawyers’ dissatisfaction in the judiciary? Where does the judiciary—
even with those reforms—fall short and leave the public wanting?3  
The answer to the above questions lies in the fact that there is a dire 
need to make a radical shift from existing laws and practices that are 
hindering, and undermining, judicial efficiency to a more robust 
mechanism that can deal with present-day realities. This Article is a 
study on strategies that can improve the image and confidence of the 
Liberian judiciary. It is my claim that existing laws regarding the 
appointment and removal of judges, the creation of circuit courts, the 
term of court, juries and jury trial, as well as the appeal process, are all 
undermining the judiciary. And, there is a dire need to amend these 
laws to enable the judiciary to meet the demands of today’s social 
realities in Liberia. 
It should be noted that while the Liberian judiciary is the focus of 
this Article, the causes of low public perception of the judiciary cannot 
be attributed only to the courts. In fact, it would be an error to view this 
problem only as a “judge-made problem” or a judicial byproduct. To 
the contrary, this problem can be traced to the executive, the legislature, 
and the Liberia National Bar Association (LNBA), all of whom interact 
with the judiciary. 
In this Article, I argue that, through their actions or omissions, those 
other actors—the executive, the legislature, and the LNBA—have 
directly or indirectly contributed to the functioning of the judiciary. As 
such, these actors are also responsible for how the public sees the 
judiciary. A review of existing constitutional provisions, legislative 
of this article. Also, the author would like to express profound gratitude to the editing team 
at the Oregon Review of International Law (ORIL) in the persons of Joshua Capp, Mike 
Harder, Annika Merrill, Natalie Pattison, and Kate Dixon. This article demonstrates ORIL’s 
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1 Sie-A-Nyene Yuoh, Associate Justice, Remarks at the Opening of the 14th Judicial 
Circuit Court (2013). 
2 Survey on the Performance of the Liberia Judiciary, conducted by U-Jay W.H.S. Bright 
(2019) (on file with author). 
3 See U.S. Dep’t of State, Bureau of Democracy, H.R. and Lab., Liberia 2017 Human 
Rights Report 11 (2017) (discussing where the Judiciary of Liberia falls short and is not 
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statutes, and supreme court opinions shows how these actors have 
shaped the public view. 
The recommendations presented in this Article are premised on the 
logic that financial and structural reforms in the Liberian judiciary are 
somewhat effective, but without more, those reforms will continue to 
yield minimum results. While those old laws remain untouched—or 
even just slightly amended, as is the case with the New Amended Jury 
Law of 2013—public trust in the judiciary will always be low. 
Shifting away from old laws and practices is based on the idea that 
existing laws are insufficient to deal with the current challenges 
surrounding the Liberian judiciary. The changes I propose would be 
amendments to provisions of the constitution, the judiciary law, and all 
other related laws that have direct bearing on the establishment of the 
circuit courts, the appointment of judges, and the removal of judges. It 
is time that the Liberian government amend laws relating to the term 
length of the circuit courts, the hearing and disposition of cases, and 
the role of ethical disciplinary bodies. Additionally, alternative dispute 
resolution processes need to be introduced into the mainstream of the 
judicial process to enhance access to justice and expedite dispute 
resolution.  
Although the analysis and recommendations in this Article are not a 
panacea to the age-old problems confronting the Liberian judiciary, I 
present a more practical approach with achievable benchmarks that are 
not only highly realistic but also financially feasible. The proposed 
ideas and recommendations that I examine herein require only the will 
of the people and their commitment to effectuate change. Ultimately, 
with the aid of necessary budgetary and expenditure adjustments, the 
judiciary, including Liberia’s attorneys, can be repositioned to a stature 
of high respect and admiration in the eyes of the public.  
Research has shown that access to justice and the rule of law are 
significant to peace and stability in Liberia. Because the judiciary 
branch is a key component in these areas, that branch needs to be 
constantly reviewed to ensure that it is fulfilling its mandate as the 
guardian of liberty and peace. The scope of this Article covers the laws 
establishing and controlling the courts within the judiciary branch of 
Liberia, specifically the circuit courts and the Supreme Court. I also 
examine a few Liberian Supreme Court opinions and other scholarly 
papers relevant to the subject under review.  
In Part I of this Article, I briefly explore the historical background 
of the judiciary and the structure of the courts. Parts II and III deal with 
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the challenges facing the judiciary, the reforms already enacted, and 
shortfalls within the reforms process. Finally, I conclude with relevant 
proposals and the benefits that will result from said changes being 
proposed in this Article. 
I 
A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF THE LIBERIAN COURT SYSTEM 
Understanding the constitutional structure of the Liberian 
government and the court system is paramount to understanding access 
to justice in the country. The Liberian Constitution creates a unitary 
state, a republican form of government with three separate coordinate 
branches: the legislature, the executive, and the judiciary.4 The 
Liberian judicial power is vested in a unified judicial system headed by 
one supreme court, followed by other subordinate courts created by the 
legislature.5 
Liberia is a common law country. It has a jury system and jury trials. 
The judges are impartial referees and exercise complete neutrality in 
the cases coming before them.6 There is a progressive evolution of case 
law, judicial precedents, and stare decisis. The courts are unified in a 
hierarchical order.7 At the bottom of the hierarchy are the magistrate 
and justice of the peace courts, or the small-claims courts. Next, and 
moving upward, are the circuit courts and specialized courts. These 
courts have appellate jurisdiction over the small-claims courts and 
original jurisdiction over major civil cases and felony offenses.8 At the 
top of the hierarchy is the supreme court, which is the constitutional 
court and head of the judiciary branch. The supreme court is the court 
of last resort and the final arbiter of constitutional issues. The supreme 
4 LIBER. CONST. art. 3.  
5 Id. art. 65; The Judiciary Law, 17 LIBER. CODE L. REV. § 1.1 (1972).  
6 See T. NEGBALEE WARNER, LEGAL METHODS RESEARCH AND WRITING 4–8 (2012). 
7 Id. 
8 The Judiciary Law, 17 LIBER. CODE L. REV. § 1.1 (1972).  
STRUCTURE OF THE LIBERIAN JUDICIARY 
SUPREME COURT 
á
CIRCUIT COURTS & SPECIALIZED COURTS 
á
MAGISTRATE COURTS & JUSTICE OF THE PEACE COURTS 
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court exercises final appellate jurisdiction in all cases except cases 
involving ambassadors, ministers, or cases in which a country is a 
party.9 The constitution empowers the supreme court to regulate the 
practice of law and to formulate the rules of all courts in the Republic. 
The Liberian laws and court system are direct replicas of the 
United States jurisprudence model, except for the fact that Liberia lacks 
a federal system. It is observed that just as the American settlers 
borrowed the British common law during the colonial period of the 
1600s,10 the free slaves who migrated from the United States to Liberia 
borrowed the laws of their former slave masters in establishing a system 
of governance.11 
From the arrival of free slaves in 1820,12 to the formation of the 
Commonwealth of Liberia in 1839, to the declaration of independence 
in 1847, the laws of the United States have been pivotal and remain 
influential in the Liberian legal system.13 Hence, it is no surprise that 
cases like Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803), are cited repeatedly 
to define the constitutional power of the Liberian Supreme Court.14 In 
fact, U.S. case law and legal commentaries are so pervasive in the 
Liberian jurisprudence that the Supreme Court has stated that courts 
are permitted to apply the relevant U.S. laws in answering issues that 
are novel before them.15 
One striking quality of the Liberian jurisprudence that is significant 
to the topic under review is the fact that the Constitution empowers the 
Head of State to appoint judges with the advice and consent of the 
senate.16 These judges usually hold their judicial office until retirement, 
provided that they continue to demonstrate good behavior worthy of 
their stature.17 
9 LIBER. CONST. art. 66. 
10 See LAWRENCE FRIEDMAN, LAW IN AMERICA 24 (2004). 
11 WARNER, supra note 6, at 5. 
12 JOSEPH BRYAN, REMARKS ON THE COLONIZATION OF THE WESTERN COAST  
OF AFRICA, BY THE FREE NEGROES OF THE UNITED STATES, AND THE CONSEQUENT 
CIVILIZATION OF AFRICA AND SUPPRESSION OF THE SLAVE TRADE 6 (1850), https://cdn. 
loc.gov/service/rbc/lcrbmrp/t1407/t1407.pdf.  
13 JOSEPH S. GUANNU, SHORT HISTORY OF THE FIRST LIBERIAN REPUBLIC (2000). 
14 Wiles v. Simpson, 8 L.L.R. 365 (1944); Ghoussalny v. Nelson, 20 L.L.R. 591 (1972). 
See also Morlu, II v. House of the Senate, March term, A.D. 2008 (Liber.).  
15 TRADEVCO v. Mathies et al., 39 L.L.R. 637 (1999); General Construction Law, 15 
LIBER. CODE L. REV. § 40 (1956). 
16 LIBER. CONST. art. 54(c). 
17 Id. art. 71, 72. 
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In instances where a judge is found wanting due to gross breach of 
duty, bribery, or other infamous crimes, the law provides that he may 
be impeached and removed by the legislative branch of government. 
That is, the house of representatives must first raise the bill of 
impeachment and forward the bill to the senate where the judge would 
be tried and, if found culpable, removed from office.18 
Although the intent and purpose of these laws are honorable, the 
supreme court opinions and other legal documents discussed in Part II 
of this Article show how these laws over time have gradually become 
a challenge to the efficiency of the judiciary and an adverse risk to the 
rule of law, peace, and stability. 
II 
CHALLENGES AND PADLOCKS HINDERING THE EFFICIENCY OF 
THE LIBERIAN JUDICIARY 
The issues with the judiciary are caused by a multitude of factors. 
The challenges and padlocks hindering judicial efficiency are not only 
“judge-made problems.” Rather, these problems are connected to the 
executive branch of government, the legislature, and the Liberia 
National Bar Association (LNBA), all of whom interact with the 
judiciary. This Part of the Article explores how the actions or omissions 
of these actors have reduced the efficiency of the judiciary. 
A. The Constitutional Walls
Most of the challenges confronting Liberia’s judiciary stem from the 
Liberian Constitution, which is the bedrock of Liberia’s government. 
In 1961, Counsellor Christian Abayomi Cassell, the former Attorney 
General of Liberia, presented a paper at an international conference 
suggesting that the judiciary is the weakest link among the three 
constitutional branches because the judiciary depends upon the other 
two branches of government to properly function.19 The supreme court 
disagreed with Counsellor Cassell’s assertions and disbarred him from 
the practice of law.20 
A few decades after the disbarment of Counsellor Cassell, the Truth 
and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), in listing the causes of the 
Liberian Civil War, reached a similar conclusion as Counsellor Cassell. 
18 Id. art. 43, 71. 
19 In re Cassell, 14 L.L.R. 391, 398–405 (1961). 
20 Id. (disbarring Counsellor Cassell because the supreme court found his statements to 
be outrageous and ridiculing). 
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The TRC stated that the Liberian judiciary is historically weak, 
unreliable, and has always yielded to political or financial pressures 
from the executive branch of government, the legislature, and other 
external actors.21 
It is my claim that these challenges, which hindered the efficiency 
of the judiciary long before the civil war, are still present even amid 
the current reforms.22 These challenges, or constitutional walls, can 
be divided into two categories: (1) the executive padlocks, and (2) the 
legislative constraints. As will be discussed subsequently, the 
constitutional powers of these two institutions have inadvertently 
slowed the growth and efficiency of the judiciary. 
1. Executive Padlocks
In Liberia, the Office of the President is very powerful, dominating
and influential across the three branches of government. The 
Constitution provides: “The Executive Power of the Republic shall be 
vested in the President who shall be Head of State, Head of 
Government and Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces of 
Liberia.”23 
The supreme court has acknowledged the President’s influence and 
dominance when it stated that the President is a great and necessary 
part of the Liberian government. The President is the only constant and 
continuing factor in the division of governmental power under the 
Constitution which is necessary to its existence. Unlike the numerical 
composition of the legislature and the judiciary, the President alone 
constitutes all there is within the executive, and the Constitution has 
placed many great and important powers in that office.24  
Two presidential powers that hinder judicial efficiency are (a) the 
President’s power to appoint judges and officers of the court, and 
(b) his power to subtly interfere with the judgments of the courts.
a. The President’s Appointing Power
One of the most influential powers of the President is his
appointment powers. Excluding members of the legislature, the 
21 TRUTH & RECONCILIATION COMM’N, VOLUME II: CONSOLIDATED FINAL REPORT 6, 
239 (2009).  
22 See generally U.S. Dep’t of State, supra note 3; United Nations Mission in Liberia, 
Liberia Facts (Apr. 23, 2018), https://unmil.unmissions.org/liberia-facts. 
23 LIBER. CONST. art. 50. 
24 Wiles v. Simpson, 8 L.L.R. 365, 371–72 (1944). 
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President is authorized to appoint all officers of the remaining two 
branches of government.25 The chief justice, associate justices, judges 
of subordinate courts, clerks, marshals, and sheriffs are no exceptions 
to that power.26 
In view of this, it is my claim that the President’s constitutional 
power to appoint judges of subordinate courts has inadvertently 
contributed to inefficiency in the judiciary because the President is not 
surrounded by qualified lawyers when compared to the supreme court. 
When it comes to the knowledge of astute lawyers, the supreme court, 
as the regulator of the practice of law and the head of the judiciary, is 
more knowledgeable than the President in the vetting and selecting of 
experienced lawyers to preside over the subordinate courts. 
This critical view on the President’s appointing power in the 
judiciary is not new. In 2010, Counsellor Philip A.Z. Banks III, former 
Chairman of the Liberia Law Reform Commission, in delivering a 
paper at a judicial conference articulated a similar position to the one 
advanced in this Article. Counsellor Banks stated that when an 
incompetent or dishonest lawyer is appointed by the President as a 
judge, the people invariably suffer and are denied access to justice. 
Therefore, “the selection process must . . . be vigorously supervised by 
the [e]xecutive and opened to scrutiny by the legal community and the 
public[.]”27 
Counsellor Banks concluded that an independent committee 
composed of the Attorney General, judges, retired justices, lawyers, 
and respectable members from the civil society be constituted to vet 
qualified candidates and then submit a recommendation to the 
President for appointment.28 
It should be noted that although I share the view of Counsellor Banks 
regarding the risk of the President’s appointing powers, I believe that 
the proposed independent vetting committee also poses a challenge for 
the following reasons:  
(i) it would be constituted by the President and, as a result, could be
influenced by his office;
25 See LIBER. CONST. art. 54. 
26 Id. art. 54(c), (d). 
27 PHILIP A.Z. BANKS III, ACCESS TO JUSTICE SIN QUI NON [SIC] TO PEACEFUL CO-
EXISTENCE IN POST WAR LIBERIA 12 (2010). 
28 Id. 
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(ii) the President is not bound by law to accept the recommendation
of the vetting committee if he disagrees with its preferred
candidate;
(iii) the prospective appointee will be exposed to a second vetting
procedure within the senate; and
(iv) there is an additional financial cost that is required for the
operation of the independent committee.
The challenges listed above can be avoided or cured if the supreme 
court is empowered to vet and appoint its judges from the pool of 
lawyers appearing before the Court. Thus, if the Court is allowed to 
appoint and remove its judges without any interference from the other 
two branches of government, this will boost the independence of the 
Court and enhance transparency in the selection process.  
It should be noted that because the need of competent trial judges is 
sine qua non to the efficiency of the supreme court’s administration of 
the judiciary, one can presume that the supreme court will not appoint 
incompetent lawyers who might pose a risk of being a judicial liability. 
I am optimistic that, because the court needs more astute and innovative 
lawyers, it will employ due diligence in selecting the best candidates to 
preside over its trial courts.  
In contrast, there are reasons the power to appoint should remain 
with the President. It can be argued that the President’s legal advisors 
and the senate could scrutinize the appointment process to ensure that 
the best candidate is selected by the President.29 It can also be counter-
argued that the elections of judges and justices in a democratic process 
may also effectively cure this judicial deficiency.  
These counterarguments hold weight except that they ignore two 
critical concerns. First, in the case of judicial elections, judges will be 
more politically conscious than law conscious as they may focus on 
their political base to win votes. Furthermore, because Liberia is a low-
income country, the country may face additional financial burdens if 
judicial elections were added to the national elections process.  
Second, because the President’s legal advisors, and the senate, are 
preoccupied with other urgent political matters, they may not fully 
apply their very best to the selection of judges. Given this scenario, I 
am of the view that this process is highly vulnerable because the legal 
29 See generally LIBER. CONST. art. 54; Executive Law, 12 LIBER. CODE L. REV. § 2.5 
(1972). 
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advisors and the senate could be easily influenced by political 
maneuvering, trade-off, or compromise. 
b. Subtle Interference
In addition to the risk of appointing inexperienced judges, there are
instances where the executive branch of government has subtly 
interfered and to some extent frustrated the judgments of the supreme 
court and the trial court. A classic example of executive interference is 
the case Ghoussalny v. Nelson. 
The facts in Ghoussalny reveal that President William V.S. Tubman 
specifically ordered the sheriff not to enforce the judgment of the trial 
court at the risk of being penalized. Because the President appointed 
the sheriff, and the sheriff was serving at the will and pleasure of the 
President, the sheriff obeyed the President. A mandamus proceeding 
was instituted in the supreme court against the sheriff to compel him to 
perform his official duty.  
After listening to arguments, the supreme court found that although 
the President’s order infringed on the powers of the judicial branch of 
government, the court was unable to issue a writ compelling the sheriff. 
The reasons advanced by the court were: (1) the sheriff was an agent 
of the President acting at the behest of the President, and (2) the 
constitution forbids the filing of court precepts or proceedings against 
the President. The court reluctantly denied the writ by concluding that 
an agent of the executive acting directly under the President’s orders 
enjoys the same immunity as the President and is insulated by the 
President’s immunity granted under the Constitution.30  
The Ghoussalny case was not an isolated event that occurred in the 
judicial history of Liberia. To the contrary, there are many instances 
where the President used his political influence, subjecting the 
judiciary to intimidation and unwanted political pressure ranging from 
the unconstitutional removal of justices to blocking the enforcement of 
courts judgments.31  
Once the President’s power to appoint is restricted within the 
workings of the judiciary, his influence and dominance will be 
significantly reduced. 
30 Ghoussalny v. Nelson, 20 L.L.R. 591, 609–10, 613–14, 616 (1972). 
31 See generally In re Notice from the President of the Removal of Associate Justice 
McCants-Stewart, 2 L.L.R. 175 (1915); Amnesty Int’l, Time to Take Human Rights 
Seriously, at 12, AI Index AFR 34/05/97 (Oct. 1, 1997). 
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2. Legislative Constraints
The second constitutional wall impeding judicial efficiency is the
role of the legislature in creating courts and removing judges. 
a. The Creation of Courts
The constitutional authority of the legislature to create courts within
the judiciary constrains access to justice because the trial courts are 
created based on the formation of new counties or political 
subdivisions, rather than a legal necessity such as population growth, 
commerce, or access to justice 
The Liberian Constitution empowers the legislature “to constitute 
courts inferior to the supreme court, including circuit courts, small 
claims courts” and such other courts “necessary for the proper 
administration of justice throughout the Republic.”32 Given this 
mandate, the legislature has created sixteen circuit courts across 
Liberia’s fifteen political subdivisions, or counties, to hear major 
criminal and civil cases.33 Because the creation of these counties is 
often influenced by ethnic or social divide within a particular 
geographical area, the creation of a circuit court is always subject to 
political expediency rather than a judicial need.  
Further, each of these courts is typically manned by a single judge 
assigned by the chief justice of Liberia.34 The assigned judge presides 
over their respective courts and holds trial sessions for a period of forty-
two working days.35 During this period, each judge is expected to 
decide cases emanating from the entire county regardless of the 
population. Each trial judge is given twenty days of chamber sessions 
for the purpose of holding conferences, issuing preliminary orders, or 
enforcing judgments. The twenty-day chamber sessions are divided 
into two, with the first ten days being held before the official opening 
of a quarterly term of court, and the remaining ten days are held after 
the forty-two day trial session.36  
It should be noted that Liberia has a population of 4.5 million.37 
Concentrated populated counties are: Montserrado (1.1 million), 
Nimba (462,026), Bong (333,481), Lofa (276,863), Grand Bassa 
32 LIBER. CONST. art. 34(e). 
33 Judiciary Law, 17 LIBER. CODE L. REV. § 3.1 (1972). 
34 Id. § 3.9. 
35 Id. § 3.8.2. 
36 Id. 
37 United Nations Mission in Liberia, supra note 22. 
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(221,693) and Margibi (209,923).38 It is amid this huge population, 
within these listed counties, that a single circuit judge must dispense 
justice within a period of forty-two working days, in keeping with 
Section 3.8.2 of the Judiciary Law. That Section provides that circuit 
judges shall conduct a trial session for forty-two consecutive days, not 
including Sunday and legal holidays. After the forty-two-day trial 
session, the judges have an additional ten days to hold chambers 
sessions and close the court for that term.39  
The creation of circuit courts by the legislature has not enhanced 
access to justice given the ratio of the circuit courts, sixteen, to that of 
the population, 4.5 million. Also, the period of forty-two days is 
insufficient for the circuit courts located in counties with very high 
populations to dispose enough cases as compared to those circuit courts 
located in areas of smaller populations.  
Because the establishment of the circuit courts is tied to the creation 
of a new county, rather than population density, most of these courts 
are isolated from the local population. The rest are overwhelmed by a 
large number of cases coming before them. This, however, can be 
remedied if the administrative head of the judiciary—the supreme 
court—is authorized to evaluate the problem and create courts based 
on need.  
The establishment of additional courts across highly populated 
counties like Nimba or Montserrado will reduce the number of cases 
on the trial courts’ dockets and enhance access to justice. Also, the 
introduction of divisionary programs, mediations, arbitration, and 
restorative justice into the mainstream of the judicial process will help 
reduce the courts’ dockets because litigants will have alternative means 
to resolve their disputes, rather than turning to the courts for redress. 
b. The Removal of Judges
The judiciary is the only branch of government that is unable to
remove its members from office, even if there are sufficient grounds 
for removal. Article 71 of the Constitution provides that judges can be 
removed only upon impeachment and conviction by the legislature for 
proved misconduct, bribery, gross breach of duty, inability to perform, 
or conviction of an infamous crime.40 While suspension of a judge from 
38 LIBER. INST. OF STATISTICS AND GEO-INFO. SERVS., 2008 POPULATION AND 
HOUSING CENSUS FINAL RESULTS 9 (2009). 
39 Judiciary Law, 17 LIBER. CODE L. REV. § 3.8.2 (1972). 
40 LIBER. CONST. art. 71. 
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his judicial office is an effective disciplinary measure, it cannot be 
equated to an impeachment proceeding that guarantees total removal 
and the creation of a new vacancy. 
According to law commentators, impeachment proceedings are 
meant to be cumbersome and frustrating to protect judges against any 
form of political conspiracy.41 First, the impeachment process begins 
in the house of representatives, which has the sole authority to prepare 
bills of impeachment. Second, the bill then travels up to the senate, 
which is authorized to try the accused.42 It is believed that the senate is 
a secure and unbiased body responsible for impeachment trials because 
the numerical size of the senate guarantees that the impeachment trial 
will be tedious, while preserving judicial integrity.43 
This constitutional framework, in the case of Liberia, is inefficient 
given the politics of the Liberian legislature and the dire need for the 
judiciary to be swift and robust in responding to ethical issues. 
Currently, there is no statute clearly defining the grounds for removal 
stated in Article 71, and there are no articulated procedural rules passed 
by the legislature governing impeachment proceedings. As a result, 
several circuit judges have been investigated and reprimanded 
repeatedly for unethical conduct,44 yet these judges often are not 
removed from the judiciary. Because the supreme court is unable to 
remove these judges from their office, the court is left to deal with those 
judges internally. 
Removing judges without resorting to a legislative body is not new. 
Currently, there are independent investigatory commissions or courts 
with removal power in nearly all fifty states in the United States and in 
the District of Columbia.45 The state of California, a pioneer of this type 
of structure, has an independent constitutional agency known as the 
Commission of Judicial Performance (CJP). The CJP presides over 
41 See generally Daniel Luchsinger, Committee Impeachment Trials: The Best Solution? 
80 GEO. L.J. 163, 166–68 (1991). 
42 LIBER. CONST. art. 43. 
43 See Luchsinger, supra note 41.  
44 Karngar v. The Heirs of Trifina Gould, October Term, A.D. 2012 (Liber.); In re the 
Report of the Judicial Inquiry Commission in the Matter of the Investigation of the Judicial 
and Ethical Conduct of Judge Paye, October Term A.D. 2012 (Liber.); Clarke-Tarr v. 
Wright, March Term A.D. 2015 (Liber.); LIMIMCO v. Paye et al., October Term A.D. 2016 
(Liber.). See also Fadallah v. Gibson-Flomo et al., March Term A.D. 2015 (Liber.) (showing 
the repeated misconduct of the same judge and the penalty levied against him).  
45 See Preble Stolz, Disciplining Federal Judges: Is Impeachment Hopeless? 57 CAL. L. 
REV. 659 (1969). 
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all California judges and is responsible for investigating judicial 
misconduct and taking disciplinary action.46 The CJP’s disciplinary 
actions range from issuing an advisory letter to removal, and its 
decisions are binding, subject to an appeal to the supreme court of 
California.47 
I strongly believe that a model like the CJP should be adopted in 
Liberia and the Liberian supreme court should be allowed to 
independently handle the affairs of the judiciary without resorting to 
the other two branches of government. I believe that with the support 
of an independent and robust Judicial Inquiry Commission (JIC), 
modeled after the CJP, the court will be equipped to rid itself of 
nonperforming judges. 
B. Archaic Laws Within the Circuit Courts –
The Unpopular Jury System 
In addition to the constitutional challenges facing the judiciary, there 
are procedural laws eroding the public’s confidence in the judiciary and 
impeding the disposition of cases within the courts. 
Since these laws are numerous and require great in-depth 
scholarship,48 I highlight only the constitutional provisions relating to 
the jury system. I focus on the jury system because it is notorious for 
its inefficiency in the court systems in Liberia.  
It is my argument that the judiciary should abandon the jury system 
and allow judges to conduct bench trials because judges are in a better 
position to decide cases than jurors. Although Liberia’s jury system is 
a fundamental right guaranteed by the Liberian constitution,49 the jury 
system is no longer relevant to the dispensation of justice in Liberia.  
It is public knowledge that the jury system is widely criticized as 
inefficient and unreliable.50 A recent survey on the credibility of the 
jury system showed that eighty-seven percent of lawyers discredit the 
jury system.51 In March 2010, former Chief Justice of the Liberian 
46 CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 18. 
47 Overview of Commission Proceedings, CAL. COMM’N JUDICIAL PERFORMANCE, 
https://cjp.ca.gov/complaint_process (last visited Oct. 22, 2019).  
48 See generally Civil Procedure Law, 1 LIBER. CODE L. REV. § 51.8 (2012) (illustrating 
how requiring an appeal bond is an example of one of these archaic laws, which is causing 
the dismissal of most appeals in the supreme court). 
49 LIBER. CONST. art. 20(a). 
50 U.S. Dep’t of State, Bureau of Democracy, H.R. and Lab., 2017 Country Reports on 
Human Rights Practices: Liberia (2018); United Nations Mission in Liberia, supra note 22. 
51 Survey, supra note 2. 
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Supreme Court, Counsellor Francis Johnson-Morris, referred to the 
jury system as evil because of the level of corruption in the system.52 
In December of the same year, this statement was buttressed by the 
former Liberian Minister of Justice, Counsellor Christiana Tah, who 
stated, “We are concerned about the jury system and some of the 
questions that the public has are not unfounded. We have heard a lot of 
instances where jurors received bribes and voted in favor of the person, 
usually the defendant.”53 In its current state, Liberia’s jury system does 
more harm than good because the judiciary’s image is constantly being 
smeared by the unethical conduct of jurors. Amid these strong 
criticisms from the public, the judiciary maintains the jury system 
despite the fact that most judges and lawyers continue to lament their 
frustration over the system. 
A bench trial system should replace the jury trial system because the 
judges are in a better position to decide cases than jurors. First, jurors 
do not possess any technical skills required to decide a case. Because 
one must look no further than the law and evidence in making a 
decision in a case, a bench trial conducted by a trial judge is a more 
superior form of trial. Additionally, a trial judge may review the 
entirety of the evidence and order a new trial after the jury has returned 
its verdict.54 This fact alone is a sufficient ground to abandon the jury 
system and allow judges to conduct bench trials.  
While this may make overly powerful judges, and this does not 
completely eliminate the possibility of corruption, the process of 
judicial review via bench trial ensures that a judge’s decision or ruling 
does not stray from the written law. Unlike a jury decision, which is 
short and simple, circuit judges must provide clear, detailed reasoning 
to support their decisions, or they risk being censured by the supreme 
court.55 
52 James Butty, Former Liberian Chief Justice Calls for Tougher Measures Against 
Corrupt Judicial Officials, VOA NEWS (Mar. 16, 2010), https://www.voanews.com/a/ 
butty-liberia-judicial-corruption-16march10-87736222/153737.html. 
53 James Butty, Liberian Minister Vows Jury Reform Following Bropleh Corruption 
Trial, VOA NEWS (Dec. 10, 2010), https://www.voanews.com/a/butty-liberia-acquittal-
react-tah-10december10-111654209/157023.html. 
54 Civil Procedure Law, 1 LIBER. CODE. L. REV. § 26.4 (2012); Criminal Procedure Law, 
2 LIBER. CODE L. REV. § 22.1 (2012).  
55 Karngar v. The Heirs of Trifina Gould, October Term, A.D. 2012 (Liber.). See 
Fadallah v. Gibson-Flomo, March Term A.D. 2015 (Liber.). See generally In re the Report 
of the Judicial Inquiry Commission in the Matter of the Investigation of the Judicial and 
Ethical Conduct of Judge Paye, October Term A.D. 2012 (Liber.); Clarke-Tarr v. Wright, 
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To conclude, I believe the insistence on a jury system is limiting the 
dispensation of justice in Liberia, and it should be abandoned in favor 
of bench trials because trial judges are under a greater obligation to 
conform their rulings to the written law. Abandoning the jury system 
will not only enhance judicial efficiency, it will also save money that 
would have been used to pay jurors.  
C. The Bystanders: Liberian National Bar Association
Amid the daunting challenges facing the judiciary and other 
prevailing legal issues currently rising in the country, the association 
of lawyers known as the Liberia National Bar Associations (LNBA) 
has been very quiet as the judiciary has repeatedly come under 
smear campaigns and attacks on its integrity. By quietly acting as a 
silent bystander, rather than leading the process of change, the LNBA 
has provided less than what is required to support the judiciary. The 
LNBA’s silence on most critical issues affecting the judiciary 
vindicates the judiciary’s critics who have little knowledge on 
the science of jurisprudence. Through its silence, the LNBA has 
inadvertently left the impression that the criticisms about the judiciary 
are more likely to be true because the LNBA has failed to refute those 
claims. The functions of the LNBA are as follows:  
(i) To promote the science of jurisprudence, advance the cause of legal
education and help maintain the independence of the Judiciary;
(ii) To further secure the passage of legislation that will, from time to time
improve the judicial system and the proper administration for justice
in the Republic;
(iii) To promote fraternal feelings and good fellowship among the
members of Association, and between them and members of Bar
Association of foreign countries;
(iv) To ensure that the ethics of the legal profession are strictly observed
and adhered to;
(v) To establish machineries through which legal aid shall be provided to
indigent individuals; and
(vi) To assist in the selection of those to be appointed as judges.56
In addition to the functions above, I believe the LNBA should be
more proactive, which includes ensuring that the courts are respected, 
Supreme Court Opinion, March Term A.D. 2015 (Liber.); LIMIMCO v. Paye et al., October 
Term A.D. 2016 (Liber.); Fadallah v. Gibson-Flomo et al., March Term A.D. 2015 (Liber.) 
(showing the repeated misconduct of the same judge and the penalty levied against him). 
56 Const. & By-Laws of the Liber. Nat’l Bar Ass’n, art. II (1983). 
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accessible, transparent, and expeditious. The LNBA should be 
conducting legal scholarship, managing continuing legal education 
(CLE) programs, and publishing commentaries to raise public 
confidence in the judiciary. The LNBA should be bold in addressing 
critical national issues, especially issues of law, that have direct bearing 
on the peace and stability of the country.  
In 2001, the LNBA actively engaged the Liberian government when 
the LNBA’s President and Officers were arbitrarily fined and 
imprisoned by the House of Representatives. The LNBA protested the 
actions of the House, by calling on its members to boycott all court 
proceedings and other legal activities across the country until 
its members were unconditionally released. The boycott brought 
enormous pressure on the government to the extent that the House was 
compelled to rescind its decision and immediately release the detained 
lawyers.57 
In 2017, the LNBA led a public condemnation of the House of 
Representatives’ decision to impeach three associate justices for their 
opinions in an elections case. This bold stance of the LNBA against the 
House changed the course of events, necessitating the dropping of the 
impeachment proceedings against the three associate justices.58 
More recently, in 2019, the LNBA provided a leadership role on the 
establishment of a War Crimes Court by preparing a legislative bill to 
expedite the establishment of the court.59 Also in the same year, the 
President of the LNBA, Counsellor Tiawon S. Gongloe, decided to be 
more vocal and critical on some national issues, ranging from the recent 
removal of Justice Kabineh Jan’eh, to the right of the press and freedom 
of speech, to other human rights issues affecting the country.60  
These activities prove that although the LNBA tends to be a silent 
activist on national issues, when they do speak up the government has 
57 Republic of Liberia v. Leadership of the LNBA et al., 40 L.L.R. 635 (2001). 
58 In re The Constitutionality of the Judiciary Committee of the House of 
Representatives, March Term, A.D. 2017 (Liber.). See also Liberia National Bar 
Association Condemns Impeachment of Justices, FRONTPAGEAFRICA (Aug. 10, 2017), 
https://frontpageafricaonline.com/news/2016news/liberia-national-bar-association-
condemns-impeachment-of-justices/. 
59 Starting the Accountability Process: Liberian Lawyers Draft Bill for Establishing 
War Crimes Court, FRONTPAGEAFRICA (May 23, 2019), https://frontpageafricaonline.com/ 
news/starting-the-accountability-process-liberian-lawyers-draft-bill-for-establishing-war-
crimes-court/. 
60 Tiawon Gongloe, President of LNBA, Failure to Honor an Order of the Supreme Court 
Undermines the Rule of Law and Threatens the Peace, Security and Development of Liberia 
(Mar. 11, 2019), http://www.theperspective.org/2019/0311201903.php. 
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always heeded the LNBA by either repealing an unconstitutional act,61 
releasing a prisoner from detention, or obeying the rule of law. In 
instances where the LNBA is silent, the country has experienced the 
reverse, along with all its negatives derivatives.  
It is my argument that the more the LNBA steps into the limelight, 
engages the government, and leads the reforms process, the more there 
will be a positive change in public perception of the judiciary. Given 
the past experiences of the LNBA, it can be posited that the LNBA is 
possibly the only potent organization that can ensure that the judiciary 
is fully independent, respected, and well supported by the government 
and the people.  
III 
JUDICIAL REFORMS 
The thesis of this Article is premised on judicial reforms, reforms 
that are more robust and geared toward establishing greater 
independence of the judiciary. Therefore, I would be remiss if I failed 
to acknowledge the ongoing judicial reforms process and the collective 
efforts of the Liberian government and its international partners in 
improving the judiciary. It should be noted that although I share the 
view that there is still much to be done within the judiciary, the reforms 
undertaken by the government of Liberia are highly commendable and 
worthy of appreciation.  
Since the cessation of the Civil War and the induction of a 
constitutionally elected government in Liberia eighteen years ago, the 
judiciary has experienced reforms in terms of increasing its budgetary 
allotments, salaries, infrastructures, social benefits, technical trainings 
and seminars, and more. 
For example, between fiscal years 2016–17 and 2017–18, the 
judiciary’s budgetary allotment from the national budget increased 
from $15.5 million to $16.9 million.62 During this period under review, 
an estimated amount totaling $613,392 was allotted for training within 
the judiciary.63 It is noteworthy that the Liberian government has given 
the judiciary leverage in controlling its financial expenditures without 
interference from the Treasury Department (Ministry of Finance, 
61 See generally In re Constitutionality of the Legislative Act of 1914, 2 L.L.R. 157 
(1914). 
62 MINISTRY OF FIN. AND DEV. PLAN., NATIONAL BUDGET, FISCAL YEAR 2018/2019 
xxxiv (2018), https://www.cabri-sbo.org/en/documents/national-budget-1. 
63 Id. at 169. 
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Development and Planning) through passing the Judicial Financial 
Autonomy Act.64  
Currently, the government of Liberia has constructed five massive 
court buildings, known as judicial complexes, across the country and is 
poised to construct one judicial complex in each county. The five newly 
constructed judicial complexes are in Grand Kru County, Lofa County, 
Montserrado County, Nimba County, and Bomi County. In addition to 
these judicial complexes, the government has also constructed or 
refurbished four small-claims courts across the country.65 
Additionally, the government has taken steps to improve the jury 
system by passing the New Amended Jury Law of 2013, which creates 
a Jury Management Office to supervise jury selection from a pool of 
government employees. This new law abolishes the random selection 
of jurors from the neighboring towns and communities. Rather, they 
are selected from the databases of the Civil Service Agency, the 
National Elections Commission (NEC), and the Liberia Institute for 
Statistics and Geo-Information Services (LISGIS).66 
A. Challenges Amid the Reform Process
Now, it should be noted that although these reforms are notable, the 
judiciary is still facing challenges amid the ongoing reform process. 
For example, the creation of the Jury Management Office in each of the 
counties has been difficult for the judiciary because some circuit courts 
in the rural counties do not have a Jury Management Office or a civil 
service pool within their counties. In most instances, for these courts to 
conduct jury trials, they are compelled to follow the old law rather than 
the New Amended Jury Law.  
Another constraint facing the judiciary is the very low budgetary 
allotment from the national government, which hindered the work of 
the judiciary. For example, out of the entire 2018–19 fiscal budget of 
$570.1 million, the judiciary was allotted only $16.9 million. At the 
same time, agencies within the executive branch of government, like 
64 Lina Wilfred Gorton, Liberia: Senate Passes Financial Autonomy Bill, ALLAFRICA 
(June 30, 2016), https://allafrica.com/stories/201607011140.html. 
65 Francis S. Korkpor Sr., Chief Justice, Supreme Court of Liber., Opening Address of 
the March Term of the Supreme Court (Mar. 12, 2018) (transcript available on the Supreme 
Court of Liberia website).  
66 An Act to Amend Title 1 of the Liberian Code of Law Revised, Civil Procedure Law, 
Chapter 22 Relating to Juries and Jurors (“New Amended Jury Law”) § 22.3 (2013) (on file 
with author). 
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the Ministry of Justice and Ministry of Finance, were allotted $37.3 
million and $44.3 million respectively.67  
During the opening of the 2018 October Term of the supreme court, 
Chief Justice Francis S. Korkpor Sr. expressed dismay over this trend 
in low budgetary allotment to the judiciary by stating thus:  
Over the years, long before and after the civil war and until now, the 
budget of the Judiciary has remained extremely low compared to the 
other branches of the Government. As I have said time and again, this 
does not mean that the running cost of the Judiciary is any less than 
the running costs of the other branches of government.68 
The budgetary allocation to the judiciary stands at three percent of the 
total budget and is grossly inadequate to meet its reform agenda. 
It should be noted that because of budgetary constraints, the 
construction of judicial complexes in each county is moving at a slow 
pace.69 There is an acute lack of coordination, and the reform process 
is gradually being stalled because of low funding. Recently, inadequate 
retirement compensation for judges has become an issue as trial judges 
are constantly appealing to the government for better compensation for 
retirement.70 With an allotment of three percent of the national budget, 
the judiciary reforms across the country will continue to be hit by more 
financial hurdles as inflation rises.  
CONCLUSION 
Shifting away from old laws and practices is an idea that offers high 
value and is cost efficient for the smooth operation of the judiciary. I 
believe that if the government insulates the judiciary’s appointment and 
removal of trial judges and its creation of circuit courts from the other 
two branches of governments, then the independence of the judiciary 
could be stronger than ever.  
To achieve this, the government can either pursue a constitutional 
referendum or the legislature, in consultation with the President, can 
enact new legislation that delegates constitutional powers to the 
supreme court to fully administer the affairs of the judiciary, including 
appointing and removing judges and creating trial courts. 
67 MINISTRY OF FIN. AND DEV. PLAN, supra note 62, at xxviii, xxxiv. 
68 Francis S. Korkpor Sr., Chief Justice, Supreme Court of Liber., Opening Address of 
the October Term of the Supreme Court (Oct. 8, 2018) (transcript available on the Supreme 
Court of Liberia website).  
69 Id. 
70 See Korkpor, supra note 65. 
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To ensure that there is a check and balance of judicial power, I 
suggest that the Liberia Judiciary Inquiry Commission (JIC) be given 
statutory authority like the Commission of Judicial Performance (CJP) 
in the State of California. The Liberian legislature needs to pass 
legislation making the JIC separate and independent from the supreme 
court, with more robust authority to formulate penalties, investigate 
judges, and report on the performance of judges. The Liberia National 
Bar Association needs to maintain its recent activism on national 
issues, perhaps formulate standing procedures governing the Judiciary 
Inquiry Commission, and fix penalties for ethical violations. This will 
enhance transparency when hearing of judicial complaints and will help 
the judiciary rid itself of bad actors and poorly performing judges.  
It is highly possible that financial constraints will always be one of 
the biggest and most daunting challenges the judiciary will continue to 
face. Therefore, the supreme court needs to reevaluate its plans of 
constructing massive courts in every county. Rather, I propose that 
counties with very small populations do not need a judicial complex 
and that the judicial budget should be geared toward creating additional 
courts in counties with larger populations.  
Also, the judiciary needs to introduce alternative dispute resolution 
programs into the mainstream. Alternative dispute resolution methods 
like mediation, arbitration, and restorative justice will provide a means 
for grievances to be heard and resolved expeditiously at a lower cost. 
The James A.A. Pierre Training Institute, responsible for the training 
of judges, can serve as a launching pad for alternative dispute 
resolution training programs. The Institute is operated by the judiciary 
to provide professional training for magistrates, judges, and judicial 
staff. The Institute offers continuing legal education for prosecutors 
and public defense lawyers. Hence, the James A.A. Pierre Training 
Institute will be ideal to launch and maintain alternative dispute 
resolution training for the judiciary.  
Finally, if a case must go to trial, Liberian judges should be allowed 
to conduct a bench trial because they are more competent than jurors 
regarding interpreting issues of fact. Jurors possess no exceptional 
expertise and jury verdicts can be set aside by a judge on statutory 
grounds determined by the judge. The excerpts presented in this 
Article, from judges, past attorney generals, and human rights reports, 
show that jurors have brought no additional value to the judiciary, and 
that the public and legal community have low expectations of the jury 
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system. Therefore, the judiciary should not continue financing a system 
lacking public confidence. 
As stated earlier, this Article’s analysis and recommendations are 
not a panacea to the age-old problems confronting the Liberian 
judiciary; however, this Article presents a more practical approach, 
with achievable benchmarks that are not only realistic but also 
financially feasible. The proposed ideas and recommendations require 
only the will of the people and their commitment to effectuate change. 
And, with necessary budgetary and expenditure adjustments, the 
Liberian judiciary can achieve a position of great respect and 
admiration in the eyes of the public. 
